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TAX IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERSTATE MOTOR VEHICLE
TRANSPORTATION
By JAMES W. MIARTIN* and R.\Y H. GARRISON ' *
Despite the tradition of free trade among the states ostensibly provided by the authors of the Constitution in the light of
,.haotie conditions prior to its adoption, the last few years have
witnessed the rise of trade barriers along state lines, including
numerous damaging reprisals by one state against another.
These in some cases have materially hindered the interstate
o)perations of motor vehicles. Business, labor, and agriculture
have suffered as a consequence.
Motor vehicle tax barriers are only one example of interstate commercial barriers;' but, according to the United States
Mr. Martin, Director of the University of Kentucky Bureau
of Business Research, supervised Mr. Garrison's work on a larger
research project and prepared the text of this paper largely on the
basis of the earlier study.
Mr. Garrison, Supervisor of Escheats, Kentucky Department
of Revenue, and formerly research assistant, Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky, did the detailed research incident to
preparation of a report on which most of the material presented here
was based.
'For a list of the "leading forms" of discriminatory legislation
see F. Eugene Melder, Trade Barriers ard State Rights (April, 1939)
25 A. B. A. J. 307. It has been estimated that over 3,000 trade barrier
laws are on the statute books of the states. Paul Truitt, Interstate
Trade Barriers among the States (Spring, 1944) 8 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 213. The subject has been given rather detailed study in recent
years, especially by federal agencies. Among the more comprehensive investigations are those by GEORGE R. TAYLOR, E. L. BURTIs and
FREDERICK WAUGH,

(1939)

BARRIERS TO INTERNAL

TRADE IN

FARM PRODUCTS

U. S. Department of Agriculture;

MARKETING LAWS SURVEY,
COMPARATIVE CHARTS OF STATE STATUTES ILLUSTRATING BARRIERS BETWEEN STATES (1939) U. S. Department of Commerce; HEARINGS OF
THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, INTERSTATE TRADE

BARRIERS (1941); F. Eugene Melder, State and Local Barriers to Interstate Commerce in the United States (1937) UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
STUDIES, 2nd Series, No. 43; W. Brooke Graves kEd.), Intergovern-

mental Relations in the United States (1940) ANNALS AMER. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. SCI.: Governmental Marketing Barriers (1941) 8 LAW
& CONTEIP. PROB.; TAX BARRIERS TO TRADE, Tax Institute Symposium

(1941).
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Department of Commerce, the motor vehicle laws present perhaps the greatest single impediment to trade between states.'-'
Mlotor vehicle tax barriers are not peculiar to Kentucky; there
are several states that require practically all out-of-state trucks
to register and pay a fee, or to pay higher special carrier taxes
than do resident trucks. 3 A second set of interstate conflicts
arises from the Kentucky highway use regulations and is indirectly associated with the tax problem. Lack of reciprocal
registration provisions for commercial vehicles placed Kentucky
in the direct spotlight of national interest when the country was
striving to build up the national defenses.
The various motor vehicle taxes, although ordinarily not
discriminatory in form, impose a cumulative burden on vehicles
moving interstate traffic. 4 These burdens may be justifiable as
compensation for the use of the highways ;- but when rates are
superimposed on other states' taxes against a single motorist.
they often constitute an obstruction to the free flow of commerce.
It is a clearly established rule that states may constitutionally regulate and tax motor vehicle operations on their highways. Roads' are state properties and, as such, are protected
by law. Taxation and regulation of motor vehicle transportation
2

MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, op.

cit. supra note 1.

Examples are Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.
4

MARKETING LAWS SURVEY,

loc.

cit. supra note 1. A kindred trade

barrier is found in inconsistent state regulations respecting width,
length, height, weight, and vehicle combinations and equipment.
Kentucky, aside from special, temporary wartime relaxations, has
more exacting regulations for trucks than has any other state. As a
consequence vehicles which are well within legal limitations in
neighboring states are forbidden to operate in the Blue Grass State
(KRS 189.180), so that many interstate truckers before the 1942
legislation (KRS 189.225) regularly unloaded and reloaded on smaller
vehicles at the Kentucky border. This necessity rendered traffic
movements much more expensive than would otherwise have been
the case. As to the police regulations consult NATIONAL HIGHWAY
USERS CONFERENCE, STATE RESTRICTIONS ON MOTOR VEHICLE SIZES AND
WEIGHTS (1942) and EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MOTOR VEHICLES.

As to road conditions which allegedly justify the statutory provisions,
see KENTUCKY HIGHWAY PLANNING SURVEY, KENTUCKY HIGHWAYS

(1943) 16.
L. L. Waters, Interstate Trade Barriers (Aug., 1941) 19
THE TAX MAGAZINE 494.
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rest upon the power to tax,6 the police power and the power
to conserve public property." The federal courts have repeatedly
sustained the right of a state to tax the use of motor vehicles
engaged in interstate commerce on its highways in the absence
otfdefinite proof of discrimination if the nature of the imposition
indicates that the tax is levied as compensation for the use of
the highways, if the statute provides that resulting revenues be
earmarked for traffic or other road regulation or for highway
construction or maintenance, or if the law otherwise indicates
that the tax is reasonably compensatory for highway use.9 The
United States Supreme Court has condemned as unconstitutional
motor carrier taxes shown to be clearly discriminatory or
deliberately designed to tax interstate commerce.' 0 Specific
imeasures of tax liability which federal courts have upheld inelude carrying capacity," the mileage traveled in the state,12 a
combination of both,' 3 the net weight of the vehicle,' 4 a tflat
"Continental Baking Co. et al. v. Woodring, Governor, et al.,
286 U. S. 352 (1931); Interstate Transit, Incorporated, v. Lindsey,
County Court Clerk, 283 U. S.183 (1931); Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S.610 (1915); Prouty et al. v. Coyne, Secretary of State
of South Dakota, et al., 55 F. (2d) 289 (1932); Smith v. Commonwealth, for use, et al., 175 Ky. 286, 194 S.W. 367 (1917).
7
Continental Baking Co. et al. v. Woodring, Governor, et al., 286
U. S. 352 (1931); Reo Bus Lines Company v. Southern Bus Line
Company, 209 Ky. 40, 272 S. W. 18 (1925).
'Stephenson et al. v. Binford et al., 287 U. S.251 (1932).
'Morf v.Bingaman, Commissioner of Revenue for New Mexico,
298 U. S. 407 (1936); Interstate Transit, Incorporated, v. Lindsey,
County Court Clerk, 283 U. S. 183 (1931); Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, et al., 276 U. S.245 (1928); Clark et al. v. Poor
et al., 274 U. S. 554 (1927); Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U. S.
160 (1916); Hendrick v.State of Mhryland,235 U. S.610 (1915).
"Interstate Transit, Incorporated, v. Lindsey, County Court
Clerk, 283 U. S. 183 (1931); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S.
163 (1928).
11Hicklin et al. v.Coney et al., 290 U. S. 169 (1933); Clark et al.
v.Poor et al., 274 U. S.554 (1927).
" Interstate Busses Corporation v.Blodgett, et al., 276 U. S. 245
(1928); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Murray et al., 60 F. (2d) 293
(W. D. Okla., 1932).
"Continental Baking Co. et al. v. Woodring, Governor, et al.,
286 U. S. 352 (1931); Johnson Transfer & Freight Lines et al. v.
Perry et al., 47 F. (2d) 900 (N. D. Ga., 1931).
'Liberty Highway Co. et al. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission et al., 294 F. 703 (E.D. Mich., 1923).
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annual fee per vehicle, 15 and a combination of weight and
capacity.'1
Due to the legal limitations on the power of the state to tax
interstate motor vehicle transportation, the states do not usually
distinguish in prescribing rates between out-of-state and resident carriers. The out-of-state carrier and the resident carrier
are both required to pay the annual registration fees and the
special carrier excises for the use of the highways. However,
the interstate carrier is required to pay, in addition to the fees
in the home state, the annual registration and carrier taxes in
each state in which he operates the vehicle; while the local carrier, who may operate over an equal or greater road mileage, is

required to pay tax to only one state. As a striking example of
the tax load on an interstate carrier in the absence of special
provision, a 5-ton truck traveling from Kentucky to South
Carolina (ignoring the extra fees for trailer and special imposts
on the use of for-hire trucks) would be required to pay in Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina a total
of $1407. Testimony presented to the Temporary National Economic Committee showed that a trucker with a 5- to 6-ton truck
(no trailer) traveling from Alabama to South Carolina would
be required to pay $400 in Alabama, $400 in Georgia, and $30)
in South Carolina, or a total of $1100. Trucks which operate
exclusively within one state would be required to pay only one
7
of these taxes.'
AfETnODS OF DEALING WITH NONRESIDENT VEHICLE OWNERS

Why Kentucky motor tax laws are a matter of widespread
concern during the present national emergency is disclosed by

examination of the changing methods of dealing with nonresident vehicle owners.
Nonresidents who evidenced compliance with their own
state laws were exempt from the original registration act in

Kentucky.is Complete exemption was also the most prevalent
practice. in the original motor registration acts in other states.
'Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission et al., 295 U. S. 285 (1935).
' Consolidated Freight .Linesi -Inc., et al. v. Pfost, Commissioner
of Law Enforcement of Idaho, et al., 7 F. Supp. 629 (D. Idaho, 1934).
".TEMPOR.RY
NATIONAL EcoNomic COMMITTEE, Op. cit. supra
note'l, t 15790. .
.

" Acts 1910, chap. 81; sec. 7, 246.
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However, this method was abandoned by most states in later
modifications due to (a) the difficulty of enforcing police regulations without adequate check on nonresidents; (b) the desire
to tax non-voters; and (c) the need for revenue. Yet Kentucky,
unlike a majority of the states, 19 during the rapid development
of motor legislation which followed World War I continued to
grant complete exemption to nonresidents who complied with
registration requirements in their own states and evidenced such
conformity by the display of license plates.
As nonresident truckers began using the Kentucky highways more intensively, some officials advanced the argument that
the nonresident vehicle owners were not contributing anything
toward the state's roads. This argument, which was plausible,
led the Kentucky legislature in 1920 to provide reciprocity
limited as to time to the exemption granted to nonresidents
"temporarily" in the state in which the owner was originally
registered.-" The legislature in 1926 altered the reciprocity provision to extend exemption from "registration" to nonresident
vehicles for a period not exceeding 30 days.21 However, this
amended act required a nonresident to register his vehicle in
Kentucky before he was authorized to operate it in the state in
any commercial activity. But in 1928 by an act relating exclusively to nonresident reciprocity the existing reciprocal provision was repealed and that provided in 1920 was again reenacted.22 This provision has remained in the statutes which
deal with general registration of motor vehicles.
Although the statutes regulating and specially taxing common and contract carriers did not mention reciprocity, they
were adopted after the reciprocity act applying to general
registration was re-adopted in 1928. So the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, in the absence of any other provision for reciprocal
immunity, held the term "registration" used in the 1928 reci2"
procity statute broad enough to embrace commercial vehicles.
Thus the Kentucky reciprocity clause as defined by the Court
' Only Ark., Conn., Mont., N. D., Ohio, W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
continued complete exemption.
"'Acts 1920, chap. 90, sec. 1(g), 419.
"'Acts 1926, chap. 109, sec. 2(g), 349.
"Acts 1928, chap. 108, 390.
"'Reeves, Com'r of Revenue, v. Deisenroth et al., 288 Ky. 724,
157 S. W. (2d) 331 (1941).
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reciprocally exempts from Kentucky's special motor transportation taxes nonresidents temporarily operating in Kentucky in
road transportation either privately or for hire. But a for-hire
vehicle "used regularly or more than occasionally in Kentucky,"
according to the Court, is subject to the same regulations and
taxes to which resident truckers are subjected.
Following the decision of the Court in Reei-es v. Dciscairoth, the Kentucky General Assembly in 1942 levied a tax on
casual or occasional trips made by interstate motor carriers into
this state.2 4 Specific examples of highway transportation which,
due to the Kentucky tax plan, was delayed in crossing the state
have included cargoes of machine guns from Rock Island, Illinois to Camp Pendleton, Viiginia; empty projectiles from
Indiana to Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant, Iilan, Tennessee; and
shot from a diesel engine plant in Illinois to Milan, Tennessee.
Tennessee highway patrols, as a reprisal after the Kentucky
Court of Appeals' invalidation of reciprocity agreements which
Kentucky administrators had with other states, stopped numerous defense shipments coming from Kentucky for inspection for
petty irregularities in weight, lights, and Tennessee permit
cards. Frequently, the drivers were cited, forced to appear in
court, and fined before the trucks were allowed to proceed. 25
In order to move government materials in foreign licensed equipment from Patterson Field, Fairfield, Ohio, to MNilan, electric
welders from Detroit to the powder plant at Millington, Tennessee, or steel from St. Louis consigned to Fort Knox for the
United States Army building project, nonresident truckers were
required to pay the Kentucky motor vehicle taxes.
RE-MEDIES FOR KENTUCKY MOTOR VEHICLE

TAx

BARRIERS

If the General Assembly should seek to abolish the interstate trade barriers caused by Kentucky motor taxes, it should
remember that, due to the mountainous topography and abnormally large number of grades, curves, and restricted driving
areas, 20 some severe regulations are necessary. Broad considera24Acts 1942, chap. 185, sec. 1, 831.
- Letters from trucking concerns addressed to the Federal-State
Conference on War Restrictions held in Washington, May 5-7, 1942,
and published in UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FEDERALSTATE CONFERENCE ON WAR RESTRICTIONS (1942) 125-148.
26KENTUCKY HIGHWAY PLANNING

(1943) 16.

SURVEY,

KENTUCKY HIGHWAYS
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tions of comity between the states, the desirability and necessity
for interstate cooperation, the wisdom of a common policy in

order to serve the convenience of the traveling public, and the
practical administration of the law are cogent considerations
favoring- the removal of the cumulative tax loads imposed on
interstate truckers.
The states, pursuant to suggestions by the Council of State
Governments and with the help of the American Association of
State Highway Officials, have achieved some success with inter-

state cooperation. Commissions on interstate cooperation have
effected the elimination of some highway use regulations and
have successfully resisted the establishment of others.2 7 Under
Council of State Government auspices a National Conference on
Interstate Trade Barriers was held in Chicago in 1939 and has
been supplemented by regional conferences and frequent informal discussions among the officials of small groups of states
seeking to deal with specific legislation. These meetings have
seemingly engendered a more cooperative spirit among officials.
State officers of Kentucky have participated in several such
conferences.
Although many states have entered into reciprocal agreements with neighboring states, the agreements are frequently
more restrictive than they appear to be; but in the Rocky M1ountain and Pacific Coast region several adjoining states have
reached fairly liberal bilateral understandings. If reciprocal
agreements covered the entire United States, the trade barrier
arising from the cumulative burden imposed on out-of-state
truckers would be solved, But the progress has been slow in
some regions; and apparently it will be next to impossible to
achieve complete reciprocity in Kentucky.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has expressly declared
reciprocal agreements made by public officials of Kentucky
invalid.2 5 Any administrative action beyond an agreement as
-7THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES

(1943-1944) 40-41; Hubert R. Gallagher, Work of the Commissions
on Interstate Co-operation (Jan., 1940) 207 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. OF
POL. & SOC. SCI. 103-110.
'Reeves, Corn'r of Revenue, v. Deisenroth et al., 288 Ky. 724,
157 S. W. (2d) 331 (1941). It will be noted that in a dictum Judge
Stanley said in his opinion that such agreements, even though the
legislature sought to authorize them, would violate Section 3 of the
state Constitution.
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to statutory interpretation would be ineffectual because no officer
of the state has power to waive a statute or forgive any tax
liability.
Three strong arguments have emerged from attempts to
broaden the scope of Kentucky reciprocity, so that it will apply
to commercial as well as to private motor vehicles. Some legislators contend that the low rates on common and contract carriers which certain neighboring states levy would induce bus and
truck operators to qualify in those states and that as a consequence this state would lose all or nearly all revenue from interstate motor vehicle transportation. This consideration, from an
economic viewpoint, militates strongly against iu'restrictcd reciprocity. It would be technically possible to deal with this
difficulty by means of a proviso 2 9 that the reciprocity would
apply only to states which charged, say, as high an annual rate
as Kentucky charged. Alternatively, a plan could be worked
out by which the amount of tax paid elsewhere would be credited
against Kentucky liability. Such a plan, however, would fail to
solve the trade barrier problem in relation to states taxing at
low rates. Both plans would introduce administrative difficulties
growing out of various methods of taxation in the several neighboring states.
A second argument rests on the view that, as interstate
motor transportation concerns are large users of the most expensive highways, showing any favor to this class of carriers would
throw an undue tax load on the intrastate motor vehicle operators. That common carriers, and to some extent contract carriers as well, use the best highways almost exclusively; that
they drive their vehicles more miles a year than do private
automobile owners as a class; and that they use by and large
heavier vehicles than do private road users-all this gives some
support to the contention. On the other hand, as has been suggested already, the actual road use by interstate carriers is
spread over more than one state.
The third contention is that Section 3 of the Constitution
Assuming for the moment that the argument regarding constitutionality is not to be taken too seriously. Cf. Reeves, Com'r of
Revenue, v. Deisenroth et al., 288 Ky. 724, 157 S. W. (2d) 331
(1941) and the Constitution, Sec. 3. The difficulties referred to in
the text could be avoided if the various states could agree on a
uniform method and rate of taxation of commercial vehicle use, but
this is scarely to be expected.
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would preclude a reciprocal statute in Kentucky. This view so
appealed to Judge Stanley, Commissioner of the Court of
Appeals, that in the Deisenroth case he said, speaking of the
reciprocity statute:
"It certainly was not intended to permit them to do business regularly in this state without complying with the regulations and paying the taxes which our own citizens must
observe and pay. Any other construction would make the
reciprocity provision unconstitutional because it would be a
discrimination against our own citizens and would violate the
equality provision of Section 3 of our Constitution."
The Judge, however, does not explain why, although granting
reciprocity to other states with respect to hundreds of thousands
of private automobiles owned by nonresidents and used to the
extent of about 50 per cent for business purposes is consistent
with Section 3 of the Constitution, 3" the General Assembly
(1ould
not in the light of Section 3 grant similar reciprocity to
a few thousand trucks. He does say that "There is a reasonable
basis for classification by drawing a distinction between those
who used the roads regularly and those who used them temporarily"; but lie gives no inkling as to why ally classification is
even relevant to Section 3, which says that "no grant of exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges shall be made to any
man except in consideration of public services," regardless of
the reasonableness of such a classification. Moreover, the Court
in this opinion ignores the obvious fact that reciprocity for private automobiles is no more for "temporary use" than would be
reciprocity for common carrier trucks, half of whose routes are
in Kentucky. In any event, perhaps this obiter dictum could
.carcely be regarded as binding on the Court; in view of the
considerations alluded to, perhaps the offhand remark incident
to deciding a case in which it was necessary merely to interpret
rather confused statutes may not be regarded as even persuasive.3' The question of constitutionality, therefore. appears
to be still open.
'See also City of Newport v. Merkel Brothers Company, 156
Ky. 580, 161 S. W. 549 (1913).
, It will be noted that some of the argument in the text ignores
technical legal distinctions. For example, under Kentucky decisions
a traveling man living in Cincinnati and traveling in his own auto
and selling continuously in this state (entitled to the advantages
of reciprocity) is not engaging in business, whereas (if Judge
Stanley's obiter dictum is the law) a truck owner operating a route
between Fort Thomas and Albany, New York, and so driving a few
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Although Congress has watched this undeclared war for
32
several years, it has as yet failed to take any specific action.
Federal interference is probably within the powers of Congress.33 In cases in which state legislation interferes unduly
with interstate traffic, Congress can assert exclusive jurisdiction
under the commerce clause of the Constitution. However, as a
practical matter Congress can hardly be expected to enact hurriedly the comprehensive regulations which would be needed to
deal fully with motor vehicle trade barriers in the light of the
accompanying disturbances to state finances which such legislation would effect. National legislation might take the form of
(a) laying down reasonable limits of state regulation, (b) defining more fully the extent to which interstate motor transportation is subject to federal regulation, (c) providing that certain
phases of local legislation be open to Congressional review, and
(d) bringing pressure on the states through the use of grantsin-aid. However, central action would enhance the national
government's power in a degree objectionable to many devotees
of federalism.
The most reasonable of these four methods in the light of
American traditions is the last. Even though the states have
the power to tax the operators of vehicles owned by nonresidents
for the use of the highways, Congress could levy a federal tax
and distribute revenue to the states on the condition that the
latter refrain from imposing their taxes on nonresident-owned
vehicles. The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 provides a suitable
framework. 34 This solution has many objections and, in addition
to being cumbersome and difficult to administer, it would relieve
the interstate vehicles of only part of their cumulative burden.
Judicial action on the ground that the cumulative tax loads
are unconstitutional is improbable. The courts for obvious
miles into Kentucky one day a week is regularly engaged in business in this state. The practical man has difficulty in seeing that the
first use of the roads is more "temporary" than the second.
'2Congress has authorized an investigation of kindred air transport taxation. In the last Congress a joint resolution (H. J. Res. 287)
providing a national study of trade barrier problems was unanimously
supported by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York.
Arthur M. Reis (for the Chamber's Committee on Internal Trade
and Improvements), Trade Barriers to Interstate Comnerce (1944)
36 MONTHLY BULLETIN 212.
Reynold E. Carlson, FederalPressure for Uniform Laws (1941)
TAX BARRIERS TO TRADE 286-304.
" Carlson, loc. cit. supra note 32.
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reasons view the problem as one for legislatures. 3 5 Chief Justice
Huglhes expressed this view regarding a kindred issue: "However important such a policy may be, it is not a matter for this
Court.'"31
Perhaps the most practical long range solution which has
been suggested thus far is the permanent joint federal-state
connnittee on intergovernmental problems proposed by Frank
Bane in behalf of the Council of State Governments before the
Temporary National Economic Committee.3 7 The Temporary
National Economic Committee, in its Final Report, 38 recommended such a committee; moreover, Henry A. Wallace,3 9 W.
Y. Elliot of the Harvard School of Government, Paul Truitt of
the Department of Commerce and the Interdepartmental Comnittee on Trade Barriers, and a number of other witnesses
appearing- before the Temporary National Economic Committee
expressed the view that a joint approach through a federal-state
committee was the most reasonable and likely to succeed. The
exeutive commnittee of the Council of State Governments recommended that the proposed federal-state committee be composed
of 12 members with representation divided equally between the
Cong-ress, the executive branch, and the states represented
through the Council of State Governments. Such a committee,
with a small, permanent staff, would function by (a) placing
research facilities and recommendations at the disposal of federal and state governments and other organizations, (b) acting
as a focal center for hearing and sifting complaints against the
Operation of barriers, and (c) referring these complaints, if
'Robert C. Brown, Judicial Trends with Respect to Trade BarTAx BARRIERS TO TRADE 272.
"McGoldrick, Comptroller of the City of New York, v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1939). For a similar expression
see the dissenting opinion in McCarroll, Commissioner of Revenue
of Arkansas, v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176 (1939).
Testimony of Frank Bane, Executive Director, Council of State

riers (1941)
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A kindred view is expressed independently in HAROLD M. GROVES
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justified, to the states or to the federal agencies for action. 4"

Through a federal-state committee, authorities suggest, cooperation among the states and with the federal government would
be encouraged and such an agency would prove a strengthening
influence in our democratic form of government.
CONCLUSION

The alternative remedies discussed above, for the most part,
are applicable to all forms of trade barriers and are not limited
in applicability to Kentucky. The only important approach,
other than outright exemption, of alleviating tax barriers to
interstate motor vehicle transport which is available to Kentucky, so far as has yet been discovered, is reciprocity with other
states-limited or not, as the General Assembly might specify.
Such reciprocity in Kentucky would have to be provided directly
by legislation, but it might prove helpful to supplement the
4
law by administrative action. '
Doubtless even reciprocal state statutes enacted to apply
to the use of all, or of certain classes of, commercial motor
vehicles should grow out of findings by a federal-state agency
such as has been suggested. Experience in other states shows,
however, that state legislation providing reciprocity directly is
practicable if deemed desirable.

" I. M. Labovitz, Discussion of Report - Intergovernmental
Fiscal Relations (1943) PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL TAX CONFERENCE 232236; Cf.

FEDERAL, STATE,

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS,

DOC. No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 267.
' Laws of Utah (1943)
c. 64 followed this plan, and the State
Tax Commission of Utah, SEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT 28, shows the
immediate results of the policy. If this plan is unconstitutional in
Kentucky, probably little can be done to relieve existing impediments to trade and to comity with nearby states.
SEN.

